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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4920
This study discusses potential economic implications 
for Nigeria of an Economic Partnership Agreement with 
the European Union. It uses the World Bank’s Tariff 
Reform Impact Simulation Tool to assess the effects 
of preferential tariff liberalization with respect to the 
European Union. The results suggest that the impact of 
an Economic Partnership Agreement on total imports 
into Nigeria will be slight. This is in part because the 
Agreement will likely allow the most protected sectors to 
be excluded from liberalization, and also because where 
substantial tariffs are involved much of the increase in 
imports from the European Union will occur at the 
expense of other suppliers of imports. It is this trade 
diversion, arising from the discriminatory nature of the 
EPA, which generates a negative welfare impact of the 
tariff reforms. One way for Nigeria to limit these losses 
is to pursue non-preferential trade liberalization before 
implementing an EPA. The paper looks at the large 
This paper—a product of the Africa Technical Families, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort to analyze trade agreements 
and trade policy issues. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
authors may be contacted at sandriamananjara@worldbank.org and pbrenton@worldbank.org. 
number of import bans in Nigeria and argues that the 
positive impact on welfare of removing these import 
bans is likely to be substantial. Their removal would 
undermine a major reason for cross border smuggling 
and pave the way for a return to normal regional trade 
flows. The paper shows how an Economic Partnership 
Agreement presents an opportunity for accelerating the 
reforms that are needed to support a strategy to increase 
regional and global trade integration. Such an agreement 
is more likely to have positive and significant impacts 
when integrated into a comprehensive strategy toward 
competitiveness and alleviation of the supply constraints 
that have stifled the impact of previous trade agreements. 
Key issues that should be addressed include liberalization 
and regulatory strengthening of services sectors to 
ensure that all firms in Nigeria have access to efficiently 
produced backbone services and initiatives to address the 
country’s poor trade logistics performance. 
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1 The authors are economists in the World Bank. We are very grateful to Costantino Pischedda for research 
assistance. This study benefited from excellent comments and guidance from Philip English, Lawrence Hinkle, Elke 
Kreuzwieser, T. Ademola Oyejide, Christian Saborowski and Volker Treichel. The analyses, findings, and 
conclusions in this study are those of the authors.  These views are not necessarily those of the World Bank, its 
Board of Directors, or the governments that they represent and should not be attributed to them. 1. Introduction 
The 2000 Cotonou agreement between the European Union and 79 African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) countries required the parties to negotiate a new set of trade agreements (referred 
to as Economic Partnership Agreements – EPAs) between the EU and ACP regional groupings. 
Negotiations started in 2002 and were supposed to be concluded by the end of 2007, when a 
waiver on inconsistencies between the Cotonou regime and WTO regulations expired. The 
negotiations have taken place in a context in which most ACP countries have seen a very weak 
supply response to the non-reciprocal preferences of the previous agreements. The objective of 
the negotiations has therefore been to achieve development friendly trade agreements that are 
consistent with WTO rules on reciprocal free trade areas (FTAs). 
 
For the large majority of ACP economies, the EPA negotiations were not concluded by the end 
of 2007 as planned.  The Caribbean is the only region that has agreed to a comprehensive EPA. 
Many African countries have initialed ‘interim EPAs’ under which the EU provides immediate 
tariff-free and quota-free access for 100 percent of its imports from the ACP partner, with short 
transition periods for rice and sugar and improved rules of origin for key products such as fish 
and clothing.  The ACP-signatories are typically required to provide tariff free access to their 
own markets for at least 80 percent of their imports from the EU within a transition period, 
usually of 15 years.  Nigeria is among the countries that have so far opted not to initial an interim 
deal and, as a non-LDC, has lost favorable EU market access under the Cotonou Agreement and 
has reverted to the less generous GSP.
2   
 
The objective of this study is to examine the potential implications of an EPA between the 
European Union and Nigeria.  Given the large share of oil in its export bundle, the bulk of the 
adjustment for Nigeria as a result of an EPA would probably not come from improved access to 
the EU market (although more liberal rules of origin may lead to significant benefits for some 
sectors and stimulate export diversification).  Indeed, more than 95 percent of Nigeria’s exports 
already enter the European Union under zero MFN tariffs, for which there can be no preferences. 
Given Nigeria’s relatively high tariffs, the main direct impact would come on the import side, 
                                                 
2  Least-developed countries retain wide-ranging duty-free access under the EU's 'Everything but Arms' initiative. 
The other non-LDCs in the ECOWAS region, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, signed interim EPAs with the EU in 
December 2007.   
  2from the preferential dismantling of Nigerian tariffs. Hence, the main focus of this study is on the 
potential impact of Nigeria removing its tariffs on imports from the EU.  Nevertheless, a 
discussion of the potential impacts of improved access to the EU market under an EPA in 
comparison to degree of access afforded by the GSP is provided in Appendix A. 
 
Discussions concerning the economic impact of a potential EPA with the EU have to date tended 
to center on the preferential trade liberalization that ACP countries will have to implement. 
According to economic theory, the overall welfare impact of such discriminatory trade reform is 
ambiguous so that careful empirical analysis is required to identify potential outcomes and 
highlight policy options for ameliorating negative effects. While on the one hand, the reduction 
of tariffs against a particular trading partner may lead to lower import prices
3 and higher 
consumption, the resulting discrimination amongst trading partners may shift demand away from 
more efficient non-preferential to less efficient preferential producers, resulting in a more than 
proportional loss of tariff revenues. In many countries discussions concerning an EPA have taken 
place in the absence of such an empirical assessment that is crafted to the economic reality of the 
countries concerned. This paper presents analysis to address this issue using a partial equilibrium 
model of trade that takes key features of Nigeria’s trade regime into account.  
 
This study updates and builds on previous analyses by using more recent and relevant trade and 
protection data, especially with respect to Nigeria’s applied tariff by taking into account 
exemptions granted.
 4  The aim is not to produce a precise quantification of the likely impact of 
the policy changes, but rather to provide orders of magnitude of the different short-term effects 
and the chain of causation producing them. Moreover, the paper also discusses two important 
characteristics of the Nigerian economy that influence trade outcomes: (i) the pervasiveness of 
non-tariff barriers, including outright import bans, and (ii) the prevalence of unrecorded informal 
trade (smuggling).     
 
                                                 
3 A dominant supplier from a preferential partner may be able to maintain the local price after the agreement and 
increase its profits, capturing for itself the forgone tariff revenues. 
4  For instance, Busse and Grossmann (2004) and Karingi et. al (2005) use partial equilibrium models to evaluate the 
EPA impacts.  Raihan et al (2007) and Sandrey et al (2007) use a multi-region computable general equilibrium 
model.  Enterplan (2005) uses both a partial equilibrium model and a dynamic computable general equilibrium 
model. 
  3It is important that the EPA discussion should not be undertaken in isolation from the range of 
other trade and development policy issues facing Nigeria. For example, Nigeria is facing 
opportunities to pursue more effective regional integration, including the adoption of the 
ECOWAS common external tariff.  While an analysis of the likely consequence of the complete 
implementation of the ECOWAS CET is beyond the scope of the present study, the current 
analysis shows that sequencing an EPA with reform that reduces the level of external protection 
in Nigeria can lead to considerably different estimated EPA impacts.  Finally, the scope of the 
EPA goes well beyond reciprocal tariff reduction to cover issues such as trade facilitation and 
standards, services and investment. In this context, it is important that an EPA should not be seen 
as a goal in itself but rather it should be consistent with the attainment of clearly defined broader 
trade and development objectives. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the structure of Nigeria’s imports, with 
special attention to those from the EU.  Section 3 discusses the nature of Nigeria’s tariffs and 
other trade barriers.  Section 4 contains the main part of the paper and presents the findings from 
the analysis carried out with the tariff simulation tool TRIST to provide estimates of the potential 
effects of preferential import liberalization with respect to the EU.  Finally, Section 5 concludes 
by discussing the issue of how an EPA could be leveraged to address key constraints to 
integration into regional and global markets.  It also discusses potential complementary measures 
for boosting “supply response” and making the resulting EPA a tool for development.  
 
2.  Structure of Nigerian Imports 
Nigeria imported almost US$23 billion worth of goods in 2006 according to official figures from 
Customs.  Of those imports, US$9 billion or 38 percent came from the European Union (Figure 
1).  This suggests that preferential trade liberalization with the EU could have a significant 
impact on the Nigerian economy.  However, while the EU is still the largest import supplier to 
Nigeria, its share has been steadily decreasing over the last two decades (from around 60 percent 
in the late eighties) as more efficient Asian suppliers gained market shares over their European 
counterparts.  Indeed, starting from around 1 percent in the mid-eighties, the market shares of 
China and India rose, respectively, to 14 percent and 5 percent in 2006.  The United States was 
the second largest source in 2006, accounting for 16 percent of Nigeria’s merchandise imports.  
  4In contrast, official imports from its ECOWAS partners remain very small at around 1 percent.  
It is important to stress that the official data reported here do not account for the purportedly 
large amount of unrecorded informal trade (smuggling) between Nigeria and its regional 
neighbors.  This issue will be addressed later in this section.     
 

















Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST database 
  
Table 1 reports the 20 most important product categories (according to 3-digit ISIC 
classification) imported by Nigeria from the EU.  Nigeria’s imports from the EU tend to be 
concentrated with the largest 7 ISIC categories (out of 72 traded sectors) accounting for more 
than half of all imports from the EU.  Basic chemicals constitute the largest category.  Other 
important categories include capital intensive sectors such as general and special purpose 
machinery, motor vehicles, and television and radio equipment.  Nigeria also imports substantial 
amounts of basic iron and steel, as well as food products (dairy and processed foods) from the 
EU. 
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Table 1.  Imports from EU: top 20 sectors by value  
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST database 
Sector (ISIC-3 digits) 






241 -  Basic Chemicals  789  2,394  33.0 
291 - General purpose machinery  783  1,529  51.2 
292 -  Special Purpose Machinery  692  2,148  32.2 
341 -  Motor Vehicles  593  1,527  38.8 
323 -  TV & radio receivers, sound or video recording apparatus 
  513 644  79.7 
271 -  Basic Iron and Steel  486  1,315  37.0 
152 -  Dairy Products  475  658  72.2 
242 -  Other Chemical Products  456  1,110  41.1 
311 -  Electric Motors, Generators and Transformers  362  777  46.6 
011 - Growing of crops and horticulture 343  1,436  23.9 
151 - Production, Processing and Preservation of Meat, Fish, Fruit, 
Vegetables, Oils and Fats  330  952  34.7 
272 -  Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals  290  577  50.3 
232 -  Refined petroleum products  260  560  46.4 
322 -  TV & radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony   232  505  45.9 
154 -  Other Food Products  229  430  53.3 
351 - Building and repairing of ships and boats  208  372  55.9 
210 -  Paper and Paper Products  191  522  36.6 
269 -  Non-metallic Mineral Products n.e.c.  157  540  29.1 
300 -  office, accounting and computing machine  120  260  46.2 
281 -  Structural Metal Products, Tanks, Reservoirs etc  117  341  34.3 
Total all sectors  8,579  22,653  37.9 
 
For many of the sectors shown in Table 1, EU suppliers have a dominant position. There are also 
a number of other sectors where imports are smaller but the EU share is high, such as, furniture. 
Preferential liberalization in sectors in which the EU has a substantial initial market share may 
lead to more trade creation than trade diversion, if the high initial share indicates that the EU is a 
competitive/efficient source in those sectors. However, in the case of some food products, such 
as dairy, it could reflect EU production and export subsidies. On the other hand, if there are only 
a few firms behind such a dominant position then the tariff reduction may not be passed on to 
consumers but the rents may be appropriated by the EU companies. Categories with significant 
import values and important EU market shares are television and radio equipment (US$512 
million from EU accounting for almost 80 percent of total imports), dairy products (US$475 
  6million; 72 percent), and general purpose machinery (US$782 million; 51 percent).  These 
sectors are thus likely to be important in determining the overall impact of the EPA.   
 
The official data summarized here do not capture unrecorded informal trade (smuggling)—an 
important characteristic of the Nigerian economy.  Smuggled imports generally enter Nigeria 
through three routes:  from bordering ECOWAS countries (Benin and Niger), from bordering 
CEMAC countries (Cameroon and Chad), and directly through customs fraud at Nigeria's own 
ports and airports. The available evidence indicates that the ECOWAS route is the most 
important one.
5  Raballand and Mjekiqi (2008) estimate that up to US$4 billion of cargo enters 
Nigeria’s market unofficially from the Cotonou port alone, which would represent a substantial 
portion of Nigeria’s total imports.  Smuggling activities tend to be concentrated on a limited 
number of products which are highly protected or banned in Nigeria:  cigarettes, textiles and 
clothing, used goods (cars, tires and clothes), bulk food items (rice, wheat, sugar), and processed 
foods (tomato paste, condensed milk) (World Bank, forthcoming).  Given that smuggling in a 
sector is determined primarily by the degree of Nigeria’s trade restrictiveness
6, an EPA may 
significantly alter the incentives to smuggle. A preferential tariff reduction on imports from the 
EU would reduce the arbitrage opportunity currently available to import EU products into low-
tariff Benin (for example) before re-exporting them to Nigeria.  The removal of import bans and 
a non discriminatory “most-favored-nation” (MFN) reduction of tariffs - decreasing the tariff 
differential between Nigeria and its neighbors – would go even further in reducing smuggling. 
 
3. Nigerian Trade Policy 
One of the key characteristics of the Nigerian import regime is the frequency of NTBs, including 
outright prohibitions (or import bans).  While tariffs have declined somewhat since 2002, the 
number of products subject to import bans has gone up significantly, with increases in 2001, 
                                                 
5  Recent comparison of wholesale prices in Nigeria and three neighbouring countries (Benin, Niger, and Togo) 
reveal that, for a number of highly protected commodities (rice, sugar, cigarette, prepared/preserved tomatoes, and 
concentrated unsweetened milk), the difference in prices is considerably less than one might expect from the 
difference in tariff protection.  This suggests that there is a significant level of smuggling in those commodities, and 
that the smuggling is effectively eroding the actual protective power of the high tariff rate. 
6 For example, about 90 percent of Benin’s poultry imports are re-exported informally to Nigeria, while almost all 
frozen fish imports are intended for the domestic market.  There are no restrictions on fish imports into Nigeria 
whereas frozen poultry is banned.  Thus, Benin tends to re-export goods that are most heavily protected in Nigeria. 
Source: Chapter 3, World Bank (Forthcoming)   
  72003 and 2004 (IMF 2005 and World Bank 2008).  Nigeria maintains an import prohibition list 
that contained 46 categories, in 2007—see Appendix C.  The list is long and covers a wide range 
of products (1086 (HS8) tariff lines, 185 of which are partial bans (with some exceptions to the 
ban)), whose only common trait is that they compete with domestic Nigerian manufacturing or 
agricultural industries.   
 















01-05  Animal & Animal Products  53  0  233  22.7% 
06-15 Vegetable  Products  103  0  335  30.7% 
16-24   Foodstuffs  56  8  217  29.5% 
25-27  Mineral Products   2  1  160  1.9% 
28-38   Chemicals & Allied Industries   5  32  836  4.4% 
39-40   Plastics / Rubbers   12  4  255  6.3% 
41-43   Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & Furs  0  29  92  31.5% 
44-49   Wood & Wood Products  15  1  254  6.3% 
50-63   Textiles   542  1  874  62.1% 
64-67   Footwear / Headgear  2  75  105  73.3% 
68-71   Stone / Glass   1  0  211  0.5% 
72-83   Metals   0  7  619  1.1% 
84-85  Machinery / Electrical  45  0  897  5.0% 
86-89   Transportation   61  0  236  25.8% 
90-97   Miscellaneous   4  27  389  8.0% 
        
 Total  901  185  5713  19.0% 
Source: Computed by authors  
 
The extent to which these bans are enforced varies and exemptions sometimes are granted.  In 
fact, it is estimated that 8 percent (US$1.8 billion) of official total imports in 2006 were in tariff 
lines that carry a complete ban and another 1 percent in tariff lines with partial bans. The tariff 
lines with a complete ban account for 12.4 percent (14 percent with partial bans) of total tariff 
revenue. At the sector level, bans are most prominent for the textile and footwear sectors, where 
62% and 73% respectively of tariff lines are banned (Table 2). A number of other sectors (animal 
products, food, hides and skins, vegetable products, transportation) also have a high prevalence 
of banned tariff lines, typically around 30%. It is important to note that many of the products 
subject to import bans, such as food and clothing, are substantial components of the consumption 
  8bundle of the poor. Hence, it can be anticipated that relaxation of these import bans would have a 
positive impact on poverty in Nigeria.  
 
Beyond the prohibition list, Nigeria maintains high tariffs in a number of sectors. The Nigerian 
tariff schedule was simplified in 2005, and was partially aligned with the ECOWAS Common 
External Tariff (CET), with the maximum rate lowered, but only to 50 percent, well above the 
ECOWAS proposed ceiling of 20 percent.
7  A number of products including rice, sugar, 
cigarettes, plastics, tires, steel, household appliances, and vehicles are currently subject to 50 
percent tariffs.  If liberalized preferentially with the EU only, these high tariffs are very likely to 
lead to welfare-reducing trade diversion. 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of tariffs applied to Imports from EU 












0 1,725  1,853  20.1%  21.6% 
0 <= 5%  4,079  3,542  47.5%  41.3% 
5%<= 10%  1,541  1,898  18.0%  22.1% 
10%<=20% 961  1,116  11.2%  13.0% 
>20% 273  170  3.2%  2.0% 
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
 
Similar to many other countries, Nigeria’s trade regime uses a number of preferences and 
exemptions that are crucial for determining the incentive structure of trade, but are unfortunately 
often overlooked by analysts due to constraints of data availability and analytical approach. 
TRIST, though, makes it possible to work with tariff line data as received from Customs and 
reflect the prevalence of preferences and exemptions. Once the various duty exemptions and 
preferential rates are taken into account, Nigeria’s weighted average actually applied tariff rate 
was 7.5 percent in 2006, according to tariff data collected from Nigerian Customs.
8   T wo  
percent (US$ 170 million) of Nigerian imports from the EU were assessed a tariff rate of more 
                                                 
7  Nigeria has recently demanded that ECOWAS institute a 5th tariff band with a rate of 50 per cent as a condition 
for participating in the CET. Subsequently it has been suggested that the maximum rate could be 30-35%.  More 
recently (on September 23, 2008), the Nigerian government approved a new more liberal trade and tariff regime. A 
large number of imports that were previously in the 50 percent tariff bracket was moved to the 0,5,10,20 CET range 
and the 35 percent fifth band.  Also, there are some indications that the list of import bans might be curtailed.   
8  If the various tariff exemptions were not taken into account, the trade weighted average “statutory” rate was 9 
percent in 2006. 
  9than 20 percent (Table 3).  Another 13 percent (US$1 billion) had an applied tariff of above 10 
percent.  These would be the imports with the most likely potential to increase following an EPA 
that completely removes all tariffs on imports from EU.  However, this also suggests that if the 
EPA only requires Nigeria to liberalize 80 percent of its imports from the EU, all products with 
tariffs higher that 10 percent could be excluded from the liberalization schedule. Some of the 
most “protected” import categories are reported in Table 4.  As expected the categories with the 
highest protection tend to register small import flows.  Categories with significant import values 
and high applied tariffs include non-metallic mineral products from EU facing an average 
applied tariff rate of 16 percent, miscellaneous food products (14 percent), motor vehicles (11 
percent), and processed foods (11 percent).  
 
4.  Simulated Impact of Preferential Tariff Liberalization 
The preferential liberalization of Nigerian tariffs with respect to the EU will likely decrease 
domestic prices and increase Nigeria’s imports from the EU.  But at the same time, it can 
displace imports from other (potentially more efficient) sources and result in losses in tariff 
revenues and welfare.  The use of a rigorous analytical framework is useful to assess these 
different (competing) effects and estimate the net overall impact.  This study uses the Tariff 
Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST) developed by the World Bank’s International Trade 
Department to quantify the potential impact of an EPA on Nigeria.  Box 1 provides a brief 
description of the simulation tool.
     
 
The simulations are undertaken at the product (tariff line) level.  By its comparative static nature, 
the model allows for comparison of two states of the world: one in which the base values of 
policy instruments (such as tariffs) are unchanged, and another in which these measures are 
exogenously changed or shocked, to reflect the policies that are being studied.  Concretely, the 
experiment compares the Nigerian economy in two different environments:  one in which an 
EPA has not yet occurred, and another where the tariffs against imports from the EU have been 
removed. The model is partial equilibrium and so does not take into account any intra-sectoral 
linkages and given lack of suitable data we are unable to include substitutability between imports 
  10and domestic output.
9 The extent to which imports from the EU are actually competing with 
locally produced products is an important empirical issue that requires further attention. 
 
Box 1.  The TRIST Simulation Tool 
The Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST) comprises a partial equilibrium modeling framework 
and a database containing detailed information on imports and revenues from tariffs, excises and VAT 
levied at the border.  The data for Nigeria were collected directly from the Nigerian Customs authority, at 
the most detailed level of product (HS 10 digit) and source country aggregation for the most recent year 
available which is 2006.  The data are used in the TRIST framework at the most detailed and 
disaggregated tariff line level. However, for ease of presentation, the results presented here are aggregated 
to the 3-digit ISIC classification level.   
 
TRIST simulates the response of imports and other variables to changes in the tariff rate.  The underlying 
model assumes imperfect substitution between different import sources (different varieties)—that is, 
goods imported from different countries, although similar, are imperfect substitutes (shirts from the EU 
are an imperfect substitute for shirts from China).  Within this so called Armington assumption the 
representative Nigerian consumer determines the level of imports of a good through a two-stage process.  
First, given an import price index, she chooses the level of total spending/consumption on a “composite 
import good,” (say imported shirts).  The relationship between changes in the import price index and the 
impact on total imports is determined by a given “demand elasticity.” Then, within this composite good, 
she allocates spending among the different sources of the good, depending on the relative price of each 
variety (say, choose relatively more shirts from the EU and less from China).  The extent of the between-
source allocative response to a change in the relative price is determined by the “substitution elasticity.” 
The base elasticities used in this exercise were collected from the GTAP database. However, as the true 
values for the exporter substitution and demand elasticities are subject to some uncertainty, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted for a broad range of parameter values (see Appendix B).    
 
In TRIST, a preferential liberalization of a given tariff affects not only the overall price level of the good 
but also the relative prices of the different varieties.  Through the import demand elasticity and the 
substitution elasticity, it will lead to changes in the aggregate level of spending on that good, as well as, 
changes in the composition of the sourcing of that good.  Both channels affect bilateral trade flows.  The 
framework estimates the potential impact of a given tariff reform scenario on both source specific and 
total imports, at the product level. It also computes the changes in the overall applied tariff rate as well as 
the change in tax revenue collected at the border (tariff, VAT and excise). Tariff revenue can be affected 
directly though changes in tariff rates, but also indirectly through the resulting import response (which 
alters the tax base). Revenues from VAT and excise taxes are also affected by the change in imports and 
by a change in their tax base because they are levied on the duty inclusive value of imports.  TRIST can 
also report the impact of the policy change on consumer welfare (or consumer surplus), which represents 
the extra welfare that the consumer obtains from consuming her original import bundle at the lower new 
price, and from the extra imports she can afford at the new price.  The net welfare impact of a preferential 
liberalization is then determined by the difference between the loss in tariff revenues and the gain in 
consumer surplus.   
Source:  Brenton, Hoppe and von Uexküll (2007) and http://go.worldbank.org/2P8FPC0760 
 
 
                                                 
9   Thus, TRIST is better at capturing the short-term sectoral effects of a given policy experiment, than at making 
predictions about the economy-wide medium term impact.   
  11Table 4 Top 20 Most Protected Import Categories, by average applied tariffs 











160 -  Tobacco Products  9,163  0.11%  43.3% 
153 -  Grain Mill Products, Starch Products, and Prepared Animal Feeds  62,004  0.72%  22.0% 
293 -  Domestic Appliances n.e.c. 26,764  0.31% 20.4% 
333 -  watches and clocks  230  0.00%  20.2% 
202 -  Products of Wood, Cork, Straw and Plaiting Materials  15,085  0.18%  17.8% 
50 - Fishing and related activities  3,469  0.04%  16.8% 
252 -  Plastics Products  69,678  0.81%  16.0% 
141 - Quarrying of Stone, Sand and Clay  8,066  0.09%  15.9% 
269 -  Non-metallic Mineral Products n.e.c.  156,562 1.82%  15.8% 
261 -  Glass and Glass Products  15,618  0.18%  15.2% 
154 -  Other Food Products  229,174  2.67%  14.1% 
289 -  Other Fabricated Metal Products;   89,140  1.04%  13.9% 
192 -  Footwear  2,355  0.03%  12.8% 
172 -  Other Textiles 9,492  0.11%  12.5% 
201 - Sawmilling and Planing of Wood  165  0.00%  12.1% 
251 -  Rubber Products  65,176  0.76%  11.6% 
191 - Tanning and Dressing of Leather;  Luggage, Handbags etc  1,273  0.01%  11.5% 
341 -  Motor Vehicles  593,116  6.91%  11.3% 
369 - Manufacturing n.e.c. 12,087  0.14%  11.3% 
151 - Production, Processing and Preservation of Meat, Fish, Fruit,  329,790 3.84%  10.7% 
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
 
In the absence of detailed information regarding the likely nature of an EPA between Nigeria and 
the EU, assumptions have to be made when designing the policy experiment to be simulated.  
Given that compatibility with Article 24 of the GATT only requires a given FTA to cover 
“substantially all trade” and following the precedence of the already signed “interim EPA,” the 
central policy experiment reported in this study assumes that 20 percent of Nigeria’s imports 
from the EU are excluded from the EPA liberalization schedule, this is the working assumption 
that the EU has adopted in its negotiations for free trade agreements.  For simplicity, it is 
conjectured that the sensitive (or exclusion) list is chosen according to degree of protection that 
each product (imported from the EU) receives.
10  This would provide large room to maneuver 
for the Nigerian government and implies that a large fraction of imports from the EU would not 
be liberalized for a number of sectors (Table 5).  For instance, the tobacco sector would be 
                                                 
10  Concretely, products are ranked by collected tariff (on imports from the EU) and then starting from the top of the 
list, products are excluded until a cumulative import value of 20% is reached.  This criterion should by no means be 
interpreted as a policy recommendation for the definition of a sensitive product list. In practice, the definition of 
sensitive products should depend on a number of other factors, including the poverty, employment and 
environmental impact of liberalization.   
  12totally exempt from liberalization while more than 80 percent of the footwear, leather, wood and 
non-metallic mineral product sectors could be excluded from the EPA.   
       
















333 - watches and clocks  0.23  0.23  100.0% 
160 - Tobacco Products  9.16  9.16  100.0% 
192 – Footwear  2.35  2.34  99.6% 
191 - Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Luggage, Handbags, Saddlery etc  1.27  1.23  96.7% 
50 - Fishing and related activities  3.47  3.20  92.3% 
202 - Products of Wood, Cork, Straw and Plaiting Materials  15.08  13.63  90.3% 
261 - Glass and Glass Products  15.62  13.99  89.6% 
293 - Domestic Appliances n.e.c.  26.76  23.85  89.1% 
269 - Non-metallic Mineral Products n.e.c.  156.56  134.31  85.8% 
343 - Parts and Accessories for Motor Vehicles and Their Engines  39.21  33.51  85.5% 
172 - Other Textiles  9.49  7.04  74.1% 
141 – Quarrying of Stone, Sand and Clay  8.07  5.83  72.2% 
289 - Other Fabricated Metal Products; Metal Working Service Activities  89.14  63.18  70.9% 
153 - Grain Mill Products, Starch Products, and Prepared Animal Feeds  62.00  38.52  62.1% 
252 – Plastics Products  69.68  42.64  61.2% 
272 - Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals  289.76  12.54  4.3% 
142 - Mining and Quarrying n.e.c.  8.64  0.36  4.2% 
241 - Basic Chemicals  789.38  28.95  3.7% 
221 – Publishing  81.77  2.73  3.3% 
12 - Farming of Animals  0.40  0.01  3.0% 
361 – Furniture  13.10  0.25  1.9% 
291 – general purpose machinery  782.55  14.10  1.8% 
20 - Forestry, logging and related activities  3.52  0.06  1.7% 
11 – Growing of crops and horticulture  343.22  5.26  1.5% 
321 – electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components  8.34  0.12  1.4% 
331 - medical appliances and instruments and appliances etc  65.62  0.85  1.3% 
101 - Mining and Agglomeration of Hard Coal  0.39  0.00  1.1% 
292 - Special Purpose Machinery  692.20  5.14  0.7% 
351 - Building and repairing of ships and boats  207.75  1.21  0.6% 
322 – Television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony  232.00  0.01  0.0% 
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST database 
 
At the aggregate level, Nigerian imports from the EU would be 7.4 percent higher after 
preferential tariff liberalization of import tariffs. As shown in Figure 2, a large fraction of this 
increase comes at the expense of other partners.  In terms of proportional changes, the trading 
partners that experience the largest decline in exports are the United States (4.8 percent) and 
other (non-ECOWAS) African countries (4.4 percent). Official imports from ECOWAS 
  13members would slightly decline by 2 percent, although, actual trade would probably decrease by 
more as the incentive to re-export (or smuggle) European goods is reduced.
11   
 
Table 6. Scenario 1 (80 percent liberalized): Top 30 Most Affected Import Categories  
   Total Import Change  EU Import Change 







101 - Mining and Agglomeration of Hard Coal  16  3.8%  16  4.0% 
342 - Bodies ( Coachwork ) for Motor Vehicles; 'Trailers and Semi-trailers 419 2.1%  1,274  10.2% 
272 - Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals  10,441  1.8%  35,215  12.2% 
171 - Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Textiles  558  1.7%  1,914  9.7% 
152 – Dairy Products  9,118  1.4%  31,420  6.6% 
242 - Other Chemical Products  13,734  1.2%  65,601  14.4% 
131 - Mining of iron ores  15  1.2%  15  1.2% 
132 - Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores  2  1.0%  2  1.4% 
155 – Beverages  1,285  0.9%  1,825  2.5% 
20 - Forestry, logging and related activities  83  0.9%  273  7.8% 
341 - Motor Vehicles  12,661  0.8%  62,126  10.5% 
351 - Building and repairing of ships and boats  3,030  0.8%  10,038  4.8% 
154 - Other Food Products  2,784  0.6%  8,149  3.6% 
11 - Growing of crops and horticulture  9,243  0.6%  98,286  28.6% 
271 - Basic Iron and Steel  8,367  0.6%  46,888  9.6% 
210 - Paper and Paper Products  3,309  0.6%  16,377  8.6% 
232 - refined petroleum products  3,496  0.6%  14,469  5.6% 
151 - Production, Processing and Preservation of Meat, Fish, Fruit, 
Vt b lO i l d F t
5,618 0.6%  28,572  8.7% 
241 - Basic Chemicals  14,056  0.6%  90,287  11.4% 
252 - Plastics Products  1,273  0.6%  7,116  10.2% 
142 - Mining and Quarrying n.e.c.  203  0.5%  548  6.3% 
313 - insulated wire and cable  257  0.4%  1,763  6.2% 
323 - television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or 
di d i d d
2,318 0.4%  6,478 1.3% 
141 - Quarrying of Stone, Sand and Clay  56  0.4%  116  1.4% 
322 - television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony   1,675  0.3%  10,763  4.6% 
12 - Farming of Animals  10  0.3%  12  3.0% 
311 - Electric Motors, Generators and Transformers  2,395  0.3%  14,742  4.1% 
312 - electricity distribution and control apparatus  421  0.3%  2,604  4.4% 
243 – man-made fibres  166  0.3%  1,157  15.2% 
352 - railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock  11  0.3%  48  16.9% 
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
 
Table 6 reports the simulated effects of an EPA on total imports and imports from the EU for the 
30 most affected categories.  For most sectors, the estimated impact on total imports would be 
less than one percent.  Among the sectors with substantial imports, the biggest import changes 
would be expected for basic precious and non-ferrous metals (1.8 percent), dairy (1.4 percent) 
and chemical products (1.2 percent).  Motor vehicles imports would also increase by 0.8 percent.  
For most sectors, the change in imports from the EU is much larger. Most of this comes at the 
                                                 
11  On the other hand, given that high barriers are the main determinants of smuggling into Nigeria, and that those 
barriers would likely be excluded from the EPA liberalization schedules, the impact of an EPA on smuggling 
activities may be relatively small. 
  14expense of other suppliers of imports, so that the net increase in total imports is modest.  For 
instance, most of the US$62 million increase in motor vehicle imports from the EU is merely 
trade diverted from other sources—the actual newly-created trade is only US$12 million.  This 
dominance of trade diversion is determined by a number of factors, including the initial tariff 
level, the degree of substitution among suppliers, as well as the initial market share of the 
preferred supplier (see Box 2).        
 






















Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
 
Table 7 reports the results of different EPA scenarios for a number of economic aggregates.
12  In 
the central EPA scenario (Scenario 1) with actually applied tariffs and the top 20% of protected 
lines excluded total imports are 0.5 percent (US$ 119 million) higher. The overall applied tariff 
rate decreases from 7.5 percent to 6.3 percent. Tax revenues from trade (both tariffs and VAT) 
fall by US$ 271 million, equivalent to a loss of 0.6 percent of total government revenue or about 
                                                 
12  These “aggregated” or macro numbers are indicative only and need to be interpreted with caution.  They are 
simply the sum of the tariff-line level partial equilibrium simulations, and are not taking into account the various 
economy-wide resource constraints and reallocations, or any intersectoral economic linkages.   
  154 percent of non-oil government revenue in 2006.
13  Trade diversion exceeds trade creation 
leading to a relatively small welfare loss of US$ 12 million. 
 
 
Box 2.  Trade Diversion at the Sectoral Level 
In addition to the initial tariff structure and the product specific substitution elasticities, a main 
determinant for trade diversion in the TRIST modelling framework is the share of the preferential 
trading partner (in this case, the EU) in overall imports. If the overall import share is very low, trade 
diversion will be small because percentage changes are based on very small initial values. If the trade 
share of the EU is already very high, trade diversion is naturally limited by the size of the remaining 
market share that the EU could still take over. Thus, as illustrated by the graph (where each dot 
represents a specific product), the strongest trade diversion can be expected for products where the 
EU's market share is close to 50%. 
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Top 10 sectors with strongest trade diversion 
















11  Crops and horticulture  23.9% 5.3% 0.6%  6.6% 
242  Other Chemical Products  41.1% 8.2% 1.2%  4.9% 
342  Bodies for Motor Vehicles  62.3%  9.3%  2.1%  4.5% 
272  Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals 50.2%  8.9%  1.8%  4.5% 
171  Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Textiles  60.5%  7.2%  1.7%  3.8% 
152 Dairy  Products  72.3%  8.3%  1.4%  3.6% 
241 Basic  Chemicals  33.0%  3.8%  0.6%  3.4% 
341 Motor  Vehicles  38.8%  11.3%  0.8%  3.2% 
271  Basic Iron and Steel  37.0% 6.4% 0.6%  3.0% 
252 Plastics  Products  31.5%  16.0%  0.6%  2.9% 
 
Source: Compiled by authors
                                                 
13 Based on government revenue estimations from IMF article IV consultations, see IMF country report No. 08/64. 
Estimate is 6,376 billion Naira (49.4 billion US$) for total and 931 billion Naira (7.2 billion US$) for non-oil 
government revenue in 2006. 
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Table 7.  Summary results of TRIST simulations for Nigeria, various simulations 
Scenario 
EPA with sensitive 
product list  
(80 percent liberalized) 
EPA with no sensitive 
product list 












  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Total Imports [mln. US$]       
Change   119 243  266  403 
% change  0.5% 1.1%  1.2%  1.8% 
       
Imports from EU [mln. US$]       
Change   638 1,222  1,285  1,884 
% change  7.4% 14.6%  15.0%  22.4% 
       
Tariff Revenue [mln. US$]       
Change   -269 -439  -671  -910 
% change  -15.9% -21.8%  -39.6% -45.2% 
       
Tariff and VAT revenue [mln. 
US$]       
Change  -271 -447  -675  -921 
% change  -13.5% -19.1%  -33.6% -39.4% 
       
Consumer Surplus [mln. US$]       
Change  259 416  638  828 
       
Welfare (Trade Revenue + Consumer Surplus) [mln. US$]   
Change  -12 -31  -37  -93 
       
Applied tariff rate        
before reform  7.5% 9.0%  7.5%  9.0% 
after reform  6.3% 6.9%  4.5%  4.8% 
       
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database    
 
Scenario 2 simulates the impact of an EPA if statutory (those on paper) tariff rates are being 
applied. This is the scenario that has been typically applied in previous studies of the impact of 
an EPA. This scenario is relevant given that the nature and composition of tariff exemptions 
often change from year to year. For example, in 2007, the Nigerian government removed a large 
number of the tariff exemptions granted in 2006. In this case the simulated impact of the EPA 
increases substantially with Nigeria’s imports from the EU now increasing by almost 15 percent.  
This reflects that imports are lower in the baseline since tariff exemptions are removed and that a 
larger number of import flows from the EU are subject to tariff reductions. Trade revenue losses 
  17from preferential liberalization in this scenario are US$ 447 million, a decline in revenues from 
trade of almost 20 percent.  The loss of welfare increases to US$ 31 million, but this remains a 
negligible proportion of overall income in Nigeria. 
   
Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 7 look at the importance of the exclusion of 20% of tariff lines from 
liberalization with the EU. In these scenarios (for collected and statutory tariff rates, 
respectively) all tariff lines are included in the EPA liberalization schedule. The results show that 
under this scenario imports from the EU increase by 22 percent (almost US$ 2 billion) when the 
higher tariffs are also preferentially liberalized.  At the same time, the extent of trade diversion is 
significantly higher, so that even as consumers gain much more under these scenarios (due to the 
steep price drop for previously excluded products), the discriminatory liberalization results in 
slightly larger (but still small) welfare losses.   
 
Finally, the experiment conducted here is comparative static, comparing a situation without an 
EPA to one with an instantaneous EPA.  In reality, an EPA would be implemented over a 
number of years with a long phasing out of tariff liberalization (around 15 years), which would 
spread the estimated impact over time and make the actual shock to the Nigerian economy at any 
given point much smaller.  Box 3 illustrates this point.    
 
These different scenarios show that the higher the tariffs (or the greater the number of high tariff 
products that are included), the larger the degree of discrimination created by an EPA and the 
higher is the welfare loss.  One way for Nigeria to limit the losses in welfare is to minimize the 
potential for trade diversion (and monopolistic pricing) by undertaking unilateral non-
preferential trade liberalization together with implementation of an EPA. Table 8 illustrates the 
implications of a broader approach to trade policy reform.  In the first column, the EPA (without 
exclusions) yields a welfare loss of US$37 million. The next scenario, in which, before the 
implementation of the EPA, Nigeria unilaterally introduces a tariff cap of 20 percent on MFN 
tariffs, welfare improves by US$39 million. Implementing the EPA together with capping the 
MFN tariffs overall has a positive welfare impact which is more than the simple difference of the 
losses from just the EPA and the gains from just the MFN reform. This is because combining the 
  18two scenarios reduces trade diversion under the EPA for products where the MFN tariff that the 
EU’s competitors face is also being lowered.  
  
 
Box 3.  Sequential EPA Tariff Phase-out 
 
The comparative static experiment conducted in this study compares the Nigerian economy in two 
different states of the world:  one (the baseline) in which an EPA is not in place, and another in which 
it is.   The exercise does not provide information about the speed at which changes occur, or about 
what happens to various dimensions of the economy during the transition.  In reality, an EPA would 
be implemented during quite a lengthy phasing out of tariff liberalization (around 15 years).  The 
impact of such an EPA will then be spread out over time, so that the actual shock to the Nigerian 
economy at any given point in time would be much smaller, especially relative to changes that would 
have happened to the Nigerian trade flows anyway.   
 
To illustrate how a phased out EPA would impact Nigerian imports overtime, a baseline projection of 
Nigeria’s import growth without an EPA is first constructed (based on the average import growth rate 
for products in this HS 1 digit category over the last five years and extrapolated for the 2006-2025 
period). Sequential liberalization with the EU is then assumed to begin with the lowest tariff bands 
starting in 2010 and to be completed in 2025 with full free trade with the EU (i.e., removing tariffs 
<5% in 2010, removing tariffs <10% in 2015, removing tariffs <20% in 2020, and the remaining in 
2025).  As shown in the graph, the impact of the phased out EPA is indeed very small at each given 
point of time, especially compared the baseline import growth.  
 




















Total imports (baseline) Import from EU (baseline)
Total imports (w/EPA) Import f rom EU (w /EPA)
 
Source: Computed by the authors from TRIST. 
  
  19While the discussed impacts are small in general, this assessment illustrates the broader point 
that the EPA should not be taken in isolation and that changes in the Nigerian trade regime can 
be made to offset the potential negative effects of the discriminatory nature of tariff removal 
under an EPA. One such change in Nigeria’s trade policy is the introduction of the ECOWAS 
CET.  To the extent that the adopted CET makes the Nigerian import regime more restrictive 
(e.g., a high fifth band), the EPA is likely to yield more severe revenue and welfare losses.  On 
the other hand, taking the CET process as an opportunity to adopt a more open regime would 
help minimize the potentially damaging impact of the discrimination introduced by an EPA. 
   
Table 8. Welfare comparison: EPA and MFN reform 
Scenario 







      
Tariff and VAT revenue [mln. US$]      
Change  -675 -231 -828
      
Consumer Surplus [mln. US$]      
Change  638 270 835
      
Welfare (Revenue + Consumer Surplus) [mln. US$]   
Change  -37 39 8
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
 
 
What will happen to the import bans discussed earlier in the context of the EPA? It is unlikely 
that the bans could be lifted only on imports from the EU but maintained on imports from other 
sources.  One possibility is that they are converted into a relatively high tariff (say 35 percent), 
but kept in the 20 percent exclusion list of the EPA tariff phase-out schedule.  We now discuss a 
very simple counterfactual exercise that provides a rough indication of the likely magnitude of 
the trade response to such a switch.   
 
In the absence of observations prior to the imposition of the ban it is not possible to estimate well 
defined import demand equations for each of the products for Nigeria. We adopt a simple gravity 
type econometric approach using data for a range of countries that import the products 
concerned.  In this model, the share of any given product in a countries import bundle is 
determined by its economic size (GDP), wealth (per capita income), geographic location, the 
  20share of oil in total exports (to capture potential the potential impact of Nigeria’s oil wealth on its 
import composition) as well as the applicable tariff rate. We built a dataset with this information 
from the TRAINS database (for import shares and tariffs) and World Development Indicators 
(all other variables) for all countries with available data. Then, we estimated the model 
separately for each product over the cross country sample and obtained the coefficients that then 
enable us to predict the import share of each product given a countries characteristics and tariff 
on the product. We use this approach to predict the “typical” amount of Nigerian imports or each 
product if the bans were to be removed and replaced by a tariff. While this approach is rather ad 
hoc it does provide transparent estimates from a simple approach. These estimates should be 
interpreted seen as orders of magnitude rather than well founded predictions.  
  
Table 9. Observed imports under ban categories and indicative import response to replacing the 









      
Total  1,828 4,236  2,408 
      
39 - Used Motor Vehicles above eight (8) years from the year of 
manufacture 402  903  501 
20 – Medicaments  361  739  379 
32 - African print fabrics, Carpets, Lace Fabrics, Towels  409  719  309 
33 – Yarn  15  277  262 
9 - Vegetable Oils and Fats  9  242  233 
7 - Maize, Millet, Sorghum  4  168  164 
8 - Wheat Flour, Maize Flour, Cereal Groats, Meal and Pallets  4  127  123 
2 – Pork and Pork Products, Beef and Beef Products, Mutton, Lamb 
and Goat Meat  3 87  83 
1 – Live or Dead Birds including Frozen Poultry  1  84  83 
42 – Furniture  28  64  36 
27 – Toothpicks  18  52  33 
38 - Used Air-Conditioners, Compressors and Fridges/Freezers  130  160  31 
6 - Fresh and Dried Fruits  2  27  25 
35 - Foot Wears and Bags including Suitcases of leather and plastics  76  95  19 
17 - Beer [Bottled, Canned or otherwise Packed]  2  20  17 
23 - Finished Soaps  39  56  16 
24 - Disinfectant, Germicides, Mosquito repellents  26  42  16 
34 - Exercise Books  0  14  13 
40 - Fully built and CKD Bicycles Frames, Forks and Mudguards  15  24  9 
3 - Birds Eggs  2  10  8 
Source: Computed by authors 
 
  21Table 9 reports the results of such an exercise for the categories with the largest import response 
(Appendix C reports the results for all 46 ban categories).  Overall, it is predicted that replacing 
all the import bans with a 35 percent tariff would increase Nigeria’s total official imports by 
about 10 percent or US$2.4 billion.  Some of this increase would be “formalization” of existing 
“informal” trade or smuggling, the rest would be new imports driven by the less restrictive trade 
regime.  Consumers would benefit from access to imports of these products and government tax 
revenue would expand since tariffs would now be collected on both “formalized” and new 
imports.  In this case, it is estimated that tariff revenue could increase by as much as US$840 
million (about 12 percent of non-oil government revenue in 2006), which is significantly more 
than the estimated EPA-led revenue losses estimated reported earlier.
14 
 
At the sectoral level, the largest import response from replacing the bans with tariffs would occur 
in used cars—imports of which would increase by US$500 million.  This is to be expected given 
the importance of smuggling in that category.  Formal imports of medicines would also 
experience a significant jump (US$379 million).  Bulk food items (maize and wheat), processed 
foods (vegetable oils), meats (pork, poultry), as well as made-up fabrics and yarn, are also 
among the sectors that would register large import increases. This is likely to have an important   
impact on poverty, given the importance of these products to poor consumers. Removal of the 
import bans on intermediate products, such as textiles, would provide an important boost to final 
goods sectors, such as clothing, in Nigeria.  
 
5.  Issues for a Development-Friendly EPA for Nigeria 
The EPA offers the opportunity for negotiations on issues that go beyond preferential tariff 
liberalization including trade in services, regional trade integration, foreign direct investment, 
competition and the regulatory environment. An EPA provides an opportunity to address reforms 
that are needed for increasing global and regional trade integration.  More generally, an EPA is 
likely to have positive and significant impacts when integrated into a comprehensive strategy 
towards competitiveness and to alleviating the supply constraints that have muffled the impact of 
previous preferential and multilateral trade agreements on exports, output and employment.  
                                                 
14  Raballand and Mjekiqi (2008) estimate that an additional US$400 million USD or more than ¼ of the current 
revenues collected by the Nigerian Customs could be collected if trade restrictions were adjusted to the current 
practices in the sub-region. 
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In terms of services trade, there are both Nigeria-specific issues at stake, such as the treatment of 
oil industry related services, as well as interests that would benefit from the active support of the 
biggest ECOWAS member, such as attempts to ease EU restrictions on temporary migration.  
More broadly, it is of great importance in today’s globalized economy that domestic firms have 
access to efficiently produced backbone services inputs. Firms that have to pay more than their 
competitors for energy, telecommunications, transport, finance and security will find it hard to 
compete in both the domestic and overseas markets.  Nigeria’s aim to shift towards products of 
higher quality further increases the importance of activities that require the more intensive use of 
these backbone services.  Box 4 discusses the implication of services liberalization in the context 
of an EPA.  
 
Box 4.  Liberalization of Imports of Services and Regulatory Reform 
 
Full EPAs could provide an important opportunity to address the liberalization of trade in services and 
related issues. Because of the current underdeveloped nature of the service sector in Nigeria, the major 
gains from the liberalization of trade in services are likely to come from the liberalization of imports of 
services rather than from increased Nigerian exports of services. In particular, liberalization of foreign 
direct investment in services (delivery of services by GATS Mode 3, commercial presence) offers the 
largest potential for generating efficiency gains that are needed for increasing the competitiveness of 
Nigeria’s merchandise exports and its economy more generally. For many services – particularly, finance, 
telecommunications, transport, and energy -- the gains from increased investment, trade-induced 
improvements in efficiency and competitiveness, and more rapid growth will be magnified because these 
play such a major role in all types of production. The boost in competitiveness needed to enable Nigerian 
economies to reap the full benefits of merchandise trade liberalization under “interim” EPAs will not 
materialize without a parallel opening of the services sector. 
 
Because of their characteristics, serious problems can result from the liberalization of some service 
sectors without a satisfactory regulatory framework. Sectors in which large fixed investments are 
necessary for the efficient provision of services are often imperfectly competitive even with free entry. 
Market failures caused by monopoly power, asymmetric information, or externalities in the provision of 
services create the need for appropriate regulation. In addition, some services, such as finance and 
telecommunication, require regulation to prevent destabilizing or anticompetitive practices. Thus, to reap 
the full benefits of liberalizing imports of services and foreign direct investment in these service sectors, 
establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework will be indispensable. This is an issue that can be 
addressed in the EPAs through technical assistance from the EU. 
 
As in the case of merchandise trade, Nigeria would benefit more from reducing their barriers to service 
imports from all foreign sources rather than liberalizing on a preferential basis with just the EU. In cases 
where network and capital intensive services are not already open to foreign investors, preferential 
liberalization of these services for investors only from the EU could give EU service providers a 
permanent advantage even if the services concerned are eventually liberalized multilaterally. Because the 
EU is unlikely to be the most efficient provider of all network and capital intensive services, preferential 
  23liberalization of imports of less-competitive services from the EU could lead to sub-optimal development 
of these sectors in the EPA-countries when the investors from the EU are not the most efficient available 
providers of the services concerned. Liberalization of services imports from all sources tends to increase 
competition among service providers and is likely to lead to greater efficiency gains and more rapid 
growth. 
 
Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
In this context, the EPA can help to reinforce positive elements in the domestic reform agenda by 
anchoring pro-competitive policies in the agreement itself. It is subsequently more difficult for 
domestic lobby groups to reverse policy reforms in order to preserve or enhance their economic 
rents, as changes would require consent by the EU. This role of enhancing policy credibility 
seems particularly important for activities that depend on large-scale, long-term investors coming 
to the country.  
 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of an EPA even with favorable rules of origin (see Box A.1), 
appropriate services provisions, and accompanying fiscal reforms is no panacea.  Due to high 
MFN tariffs, the persistence of import bans and other non-tariff barriers, and a highly 
concentrated export base, even a doubling of non-fuel exports to the EU and to regional partners 
─ although welcome ─ would hardly generate the economic growth rates that Nigerian policy 
makers are aspiring to.  An additional stimulus for growth and development is called for, and it 
seems advisable for policy makers to not lose focus on the question of how to maintain and 
strengthen the country’s competitiveness in the global market.  In fact, preferential integration 
and active participation in global markets do not present exclusive or opposing choices. Many 
successful countries have indeed build their strategy around a paradigm of “open regionalism”, 
which implies negotiating reciprocal preferences with partner countries while actively integrating 
into international markets at the same time. Strengthening Nigeria’s non-fuel export performance 
is a major challenge and requires attention to the incentives that actual and potential exporters 
face, the costs of trade and transport logistics to get products efficiently to overseas markets, and 
the effectiveness of trade support institutions that help private sector firms to discover and 
exploit international market opportunities.   
 
Improving export performance will require movement of resources from less productive to more 
productive exporting firms as the latter expand the range of markets into which they sell as well 
  24as exports per market.  Also, resource mobility will facilitate the export of higher quality 
products, which will tend to a have a somewhat different input mix than traditional or lower 
quality products. Finally, resources need to be flexible enough to allow the emergence of new 
export activities.  Hence, a key challenge for policy makers is to ensure that land, labor, capital 
and technology are moving to (a) sectors in which the country has a long-term capacity to 
compete and (b) to the most productive firms within sectors. This necessitates a clear 
understanding of how the macroeconomic stance, the business environment, and trade and tax 
policies interact to affect investment, output and trade decisions. 
 
A major impediment to export growth is the strong anti-export bias in Nigeria’s trade regime.  
Nigeria has traditionally had very high levels of MFN tariff protection and numerous import 
bans, and despite recent reforms continues to be more protectionist than the averages for Sub-
Saharan Africa and the world.  High trade and transport costs to get products to export markets 
are another major impediment. A newly developed Logistics Performance Index (World Bank, 
2007b), which is based on a world-wide survey of global freight forwarders and express carriers, 
makes it possible to compare the situation of countries across a broad set of transport and trade 
facilitation dimensions.  The LPI provides information on several distinct dimensions of trade 
and transport logistics.  It turns out that Nigeria’s performance is far from best practice, and 
mediocre even by the relatively low standards in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3).  Logistics 
experts see the most pronounced deficits in the areas of customs administration and logistics 
infrastructure.  Moreover, with respect to logistics costs and timeliness of border clearance, 
Nigeria scores worse than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
  25Figure 3:  Logistics Performance is Mediocre 
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Source:  World Bank (2007b). 
 
A third area besides the trade regime and trade transactions costs that warrants the attention of 
policy makers is export promotion.  Both market and government failures tend to afflict 
developing countries as they seek to expand exports and growth.  Trade policies that provide 
low-tariffs are rarely sufficient to prompt dynamic export drives or overcome obstacles in other 
areas.  In many cases, these constraints to competitiveness impinge more on higher quality and 
differentiated products and require specific interventions and institutions. A successful export 
diversification strategy should not just focus on developing products, but also look for ways to 
exploit new market opportunities for existing export goods.  
 
Nigeria has pursued a number of initiatives to encourage non-oil exports in the past, including 
the establishment of Special Economic Zones, the operation of a duty drawback system, as well 
as bank guarantees and direct lending to facilitate exports (World Bank, 2007).  Yet, the most 
prominent export incentive system that has been used in Nigeria in evolving forms since 1986 is 
the export expansion grant (EEG) program.  This program subsidizes exports of qualifying 
companies through the issuance by Customs of negotiated certificates that can be redeemed 
  26against duties on imports.  The size of the subsidies of up to 40 percent of export value and the 
lack of controls has given rise to wide-spread fraud, such as the over-invoicing of exports, while 
the supply response from actual or potential exporters is unclear.  In this context, the government 
should put regular mechanisms in place to evaluate the use of the EEG funds and to assess if and 
to what extent the program achieves its stated objective.  More generally, a broader review of 
export incentive schemes would seem highly desirable in order to rationalize the government’s 
support to exporters, improve its efficiency, and minimize the risk of abuse. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Discussions concerning the economic impact of a potential EPA with the EU have centered on 
the preferential trade liberalization that ACP countries will have to implement. Economic theory 
shows that the overall welfare impact of such discriminatory trade reform is ambiguous so that 
careful empirical analysis is required to identify potential outcomes and highlight policy options 
for ameliorating negative effects. In many countries these discussions have taken place in the 
absence of such an empirical assessment that is crafted to the economic reality of the countries 
concerned.  
 
In this paper we address this issue using detailed data from Nigeria’s customs in a partial 
equilibrium trade simulation model. The simulation results show that overall impacts on imports 
are likely to be slight, firstly, since in reality an EPA will allow Nigeria to exclude the most 
protected products from liberalization and, second, because there is likely to be substantial trade 
diversion from other import suppliers towards the EU. It is this trade diversion that leads to 
negative economic impacts from the EPA. This can be minimized by prior reduction of high 
(peak) external MFN tariffs, a reform that would reduce remaining anti-export bias in the trade 
regime and assist more effective integration into regional and global markets.    
 
The paper also highlights the importance of other aspects of trade policy in Nigeria and, in 
particular, the import bans that affect a wide range of products. Reform of these bans, in terms of 
tariffication and subsequent tariff reduction, is likely to be strongly welfare improving, with 
significant benefits for poor consumers, since imports of a number of food products, footwear 
and clothing are currently banned. In addition, such a reform would improve the basis for 
  27effective intra-regional integration by reducing a key factor that encourages smuggling from 
neighboring countries across Nigeria’s borders. 
 
While these standard trade policy issues relating to tariffs and import controls are an important 
aspect of the EPAs, they are one element of the policy pool that could be leveraged to turn the 
EPA into an instrument for economic development and inclusive growth. Substantial untapped 
opportunities are discernable in areas that have been largely neglected so far in the EPA 
discussions, notably concerning rules of origin and services sector reforms. Further, trade and 
transport facilitation, as well as more effective export promotion efforts clearly deserve a higher 
profile on the policy agenda.  The associated policy reforms are critical to support the supply 
response that is necessary for the EPA to be a success, but will also make Nigeria more 
competitive in international markets. The policy challenges to first negotiate and then implement 
such a comprehensive EPA are daunting and must be addressed through appropriate technical 
assistance and support from the international community, possibly in the form of ‘aid for trade’.  
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  30Appendix A. Implications of an EPA for Nigerian export prospects 
This Appendix discusses the implications of the end of the current Cotonou system of 
preferences for Nigeria’s market access to the EU. It uses detailed data from the Eurostat Comext 
and UNCTAD Trains databases to investigate the tariff barriers that Nigerian exporters would 
face under two alternative policy scenarios. The first scenario assumes an agreement on an EPA 
granting Nigeria duty and quota free access to the EU for all products. The second, examines the 
impact of exporting to the EU under the GSP.
15 Both cases are compared to the baseline situation 
under the Cotonou agreement.  While it is clear that going back to Cotonou is no longer an 
option, making the comparisons between an EPA and the Cotonou situation, and then between 
GSP and Cotonou allows a clear decomposition of the gains and losses between the two options 
available to Nigeria (EPA versus GSP). 
 
Table A.1 shows that preferences under Cotonou represented a tiny fraction (0.17 percent) of the 
overall value of Nigeria’s exports to the EU.
16  As a comparison, the corresponding figure for 
ECOWAS members as a whole is 1.43 percent.  The main reason for such a small number for 
Nigeria is the large share of oil in its export bundle.  Indeed, more than 95 percent of Nigeria’s 
exports enter the European Union under zero MFN tariffs, for which there can be no preferences. 
 
If only non-fuel exports are considered, the value of Nigeria’s preferences as a share of its 
exports to the EU goes up to 1.8 percent, still a small number.    
  
Table A.1 shows that Nigeria claims 84 percent of the preferences for which it is eligible in the 
EU—compared to an average of 85 percent for ECOWAS members.
17  The main reasons why 
preferences may not be fully utilized are restrictive rules of origin, the costs of proving 
compliance with the rules of origin relative to the margin of tariff preferences and lack of 
information on the availability of preferences.   This suggests a small margin for improvement in 
preference utilization of existing exports from an EPA with less restrictive rules of origin and 
greater awareness of preferential market access possibilities. Nevertheless, for some products, for 
example clothing, the EU rules of origin under the Cotonou Agreement and under the GSP are 
likely to be prohibitive, such that, no exports are feasible given that the rules preclude the use of 
necessary inputs from global sources. Where these rules have been relaxed there is evidence that 
a considerable supply response can materialize leading to substantial increases in exports and 
employment (See Box A.1 for a more detailed discussion).   
 
                                                 
15 Hoppe (2007) conducts similar analysis, by comparing the value of EU preferences under various scenarios for 
African Non-LDCs.  As in the present analysis, he finds that the value of preferences to Nigeria is minuscule, and is 
not significantly affected by changes in the EU preferential scheme. 
16  The actual value of preferences can be calculated as the difference between the total duties that would have been 
paid without preferences (based on MFN tariffs) and the duties that are actually paid using the trade preferences.  In 
comparison to the small number for Nigeria, Hoppe (2007) reports that the value of preference for Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, and Swaziland are respectively 23, 16, and 50 percent, of their overall exports to the EU. 
17 The utilization rate is calculated as follows: (value of claimed preferences/value of potential preferences)*100.  






























(as % of 
exports to 
EU) 
Benin 40,563  79.27  2,648 2,600 98.19  6.53  6.41 
Burkina 
Faso 38,256  67.74  415  303  72.99 1.08 0.79 
Cape 
Verde 24,115  11.87  3,169 3,075 97.02 13.14 12.75 
Ivory Coast  2,539,323  60.32  132,939 111,779  84.08 5.24  4.4 
Gambia 7,788  49.36  416  233  55.92 5.34 2.99 
Ghana 1,247,375  65.92  44,918 40,190  89.48  3.6  3.22 
Guinea 534,698  93.66  3,656 1,976 54.06  0.68  0.37 
Guinea 
Biss. 4,268  33.85  300  208  69.35 7.02 4.87 
Liberia 777,126  99.8  146  101  69.56 0.02 0.01 
Mali 54,237  94.32  198  98  49.75 0.36 0.18 
Niger 169,159  97.76  120  101  85.16 0.07 0.06 
Nigeria  10,815,870  96.1  17,984  15,116  84.06  0.17  0.14 
Senegal 668,117  55.23  36,881  32,700  88.66 5.52 4.89 
Sierra 
Leone  157,032 99.06  134  92  69.5 0.09 0.06 
Togo 150,570  84.63  1,668  1,616  96.89 1.11 1.07 
TOTAL 17,228,494  86.83  245,588  210,189  85.59 1.43 1.22 
Note:          
a. The utilization rate is calculated as follows: (value of claimed preferences/value of potential preferences)*100. 
Sources: Eurostat Comext, UNCTAD Trains, and authors' calculations. 
 
Detailed study of the tariff information available from EUROSTAT COMEXT reveals that in 
comparing the situation under Cotonou in 2005 with market access under an EPA, only 81 lines 
of the EU eight-digit tariff schedule with ad valorem tariffs would experience improved access 
conditions under an EPA, and only 2 of these lines represent goods that Nigeria exports (chicory 
and spinach) but these exports are currently negligible.
18  A number of Nigerian export 
commodities (626 tariff lines) face significant non-ad-valorem (specific) tariffs under Cotonou 
preferences and thus could conceivably gain from an EPA.  Nevertheless, while specific sectoral 
exports may expand, the overall impact of an EPA on Nigeria’s market access compared to the 
situation under Cotonou is likely to be small since the majority of exports are already entering 
the European market duty free.
19    
 
By contrast, by switching to GSP, 3,109 ad valorem lines experienced a deterioration of market 
access conditions (that is, GSP tariff rates are higher than Cotonou preferential rates). Nigeria 
currently exports goods in 272 of these lines, amounting to 1.7 percent of the total value of 
Nigerian exports to the EU but around 20 percent of the value of Nigerian non-fuel exports to the 
EU. Table A.2 reports Nigeria’s export sectors (aggregated to the ISIC-3 digit classification) that 
                                                 
18 The total number of ad valorem tariff lines under Cotonou is 9,697.  
19  This analysis considers only currently traded goods.  It is conceivable that following further liberalization by the 
EU of the remaining non-zero tariffs, Nigeria starts to exports new commodities that it has not previously exported.  
  32have been most affected by the change.  In general, the tariff increases are modest.  In the sectors 
with important tariff hikes (tobacco products, footwear, and apparel and textiles), Nigeria’s 
export to the EU tend to be very small.  Important sectors with significant exports include 
processed food (US$63 million facing a tariff increase of 4 percent), textiles (US$17 million 
facing a tariff increase of 3 percent), man-made fibers (US$17 million facing a tariff increase of 
3 percent). 
 
Table A.2.: Implications of a non-EPA for Nigeria's EU market access: Top 20 most affected sectors. 









160 - Tobacco Products  0.00%  38.68%  99 
192 – Footwear  0.00%  11.61%  402 
181 - Wearing Apparel, Except Fur Apparel  0.00%  9.07%  154 
173 – knitted and crocheted textiles and fabrics  0.00%  9.05%  15 
341 - Motor Vehicles  0.00%  6.50%  153 
172 - Other Textiles  0.00%  5.96%  64 
151 - Production, Processing and Preservation of Meat, Fish, 
Fruit, Vegetables, Oils and Fats  0.00% 4.10%  63,677 
359 - Transport Equipment n.e.c. 0.00%  3.89%  4 
171 - Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Textiles  0.00% 3.40%  16,844 
243 - man-made fibres  0.00%  3.20%  16,616 
269 - Non-metallic Mineral Products n.e.c.  0.00%  2.38%  40 
153 - Grain Mill Products, Starches and Starch Products, and 
Prepared Animal Feeds  0.00% 1.19%  129 
333 - watches and clocks  0.00%  1.04%  23 
261 - Glass and Glass Products  0.00%  0.89%  31 
332 - Optical Instruments and Photographic Equipment  0.00%  0.86%  375 
155 – Beverages  0.00%  0.83%  3,327 
323 - television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 
or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods  0.00% 0.66%  1,095 
154 - Other Food Products 0.00%  0.39%  394,907 
11 - Growing of crops and horticulture  0.00%  0.26%  40,271 
50 - Fishing and related activities  0.00%  0.12%  4,306 
241 - Basic Chemicals  0.00%  0.04%  14,622 
Sources: Eurostat Comext, UNCTAD Trains, and authors' calculations. 
.   
 
Box A.1 On the Importance of Rules of Origin 
With respect to market access into the EU, one aspect that merits the attention of policy makers and 
negotiators are the rules of origin requirements (ROOs) for access to the EU market.  While the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) will maintain most of Nigeria’s preferential access to the EU 
market (and avoid significant disruption in current Nigeria-EU trade) the EU’s restrictive ROO limit the 
benefits of the market access provided under GSP.  Relaxing the current complex product and process 
specific rules of origin and adopting a scheme that allows exporters to satisfy either a uniform change of 
tariff heading at the HS 6-digit level or a ten-percent value added rule could encourage the expansion and 
diversification of Nigeria’s exports.  
 
Preferential trading agreements use ROOs to ensure that products from third countries do not circumvent 
duties by requesting the preferential treatment that members of a RTA grant to one another.  They specify 
  33the amount of processing that a product must undergo in partner countries in order to quality for market 
access under the preferential agreement.  However, domestic interests seeking to limit the competitive 
impact of preferential tariff removal may lobby for overly restrictive rules of origin. In a globalised 
economy strong limitations on the use of imported inputs can undermine the ability to compete in 
international markets.  
 
A comparison of export developments for apparel from Least Developed Countries in Africa to the 
European Union and the United States provides a powerful illustration of the importance of rules of origin 
in determining export success.  Both the EU’s Everything but Arms program and the USA’s African 
Growth and Opportunities Act grant duty and quota free access to apparel exports from LDCs.  However, 
AGOA provides in addition for ROOs that are far easier to meet than the corresponding EU requirements. 
In particular, AGOA allows qualifying countries to count yarn and fabric from anywhere in the world as 
local content in apparel assembled in their countries, while the EU demands a double transformation such 
that apparel must be made from fabric that originates within the region.  Inspection of export data shows 
that exports from LDCs in Africa to the USA have surged following the introduction of AGOA in 2000, 
while shipments to the EU have remained flat (Figure 1).  Thus, rules of origin matter. In the interim 
agreements that the EU has signed the rules of origin for clothing, and to an extent for fish and some 
processed agricultural products, have been relaxed so that clothing producers in signatories can now use 
fabrics from say, Asia, and still qualify for preferential access to the EU market.   
 
Rules of Origin are an Important Determinant of Export Performance 
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Source: Brenton and Hoppe (2007). 
  34Appendix B. Sensitivity Analyses: Simulating an EPA using different elasticities  
 
Scenario 
EPA with no sensitive 
product list - all tariffs with 
the EU reduced to zero 
EPA with a sensitive 
product list (20% of trade 
value excluded from 
liberalization) 
Column  no.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
elasticity  low high  GTAP  low high  GTAP 
                    
Total Imports [mln. US$]                
before reform  22,653 22,653 22,653 22,653 22,653 22,653 
after reform  22,899 23,178 22,919 22,767 22,891 22,772 
Change   246 525 266 114 238 119 
% change  1.1% 2.3% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 0.5% 
                    
Imports from EU [mln. US$]                   
before reform  8,579 8,579 8,579 8,579 8,579 8,579 
after reform  9,025 9,806 9,864 8,785 9,156 9,217 
Change   445  1,226  1,285 206 577 638 
% change  5.2% 14.3% 15.0%  2.4% 6.7% 7.4% 
                    
Tariff Revenue [mln. US$]                
before reform  1,693 1,693 1,693 1,693 1,693 1,693 
after reform  1,124 1,062 1,022 1,450 1,434 1,423 
Change   -569 -631 -671 -243 -259 -269 
% change  -33.6% -37.3% -39.6% -14.4% -15.3% -15.9% 
                    
Tariff and VAT revenue [mln. US$]                
before reform  2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 
after reform  1,434 1,372 1,333 1,760 1,744 1,736 
change  -573 -635 -675 -248 -263 -271 
% change  -28.6% -31.7% -33.6% -12.3% -13.1% -13.5% 
                    
Applied tariff rate                 
before reform  7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 
after reform  4.9% 4.6% 4.5% 6.4% 6.3% 6.3% 
                    
Trade Diversion [mln. US$]                
value  310 915  1,123 140 434 565 
% of imports  1.4% 4.0% 5.0% 0.6% 1.9% 2.5% 
                    
Source: Computed by authors based on TRIST model and database 
Note: Low elasticities: substitution elasticity = 1.5, demand elasticity = 0.5, High elasticities: substitution elasticity 
= 5, demand elasticity = 1.   
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Appendix C.  Import Bans in Nigeria 
 








Total  1,828 4,236  -2,408 
39 - Used Motor Vehicles above eight (8) years from the year of manufacture  402  903  -501 
20 – Medicaments  361 739  -379 
32 - African print fabrics, Carpets, Lace Fabrics, Towels  409  719  -309 
33 – Yarn  15 277  -262 
9 - Vegetable Oils and Fats  9  242  -233 
7 - Maize, Millet, Sorghum  4  168  -164 
8 - Wheat Flour, Maize Flour, Cereal Groats, Meal and Pallets  4  127  -123 
2 - Pork and Pork Products, Beef and Beef Products, Mutton, Lamb and Goat Meat  3  87  -83 
1 - Live or Dead Birds including Frozen Poultry  1  84  -83 
42 – Furniture  28 64  -36 
27 – Toothpicks  18 52  -33 
38 - Used Air-Conditioners, Compressors and Fridges/Freezers  130  160  -31 
6 - Fresh and Dried Fruits  2  27  -25 
35 - Foot Wears and Bags including Suitcases of leather and plastics  76  95  -19 
17 - Beer [Bottled, Canned or otherwise Packed]  2  20  -17 
23 - Finished Soaps  39 56  -16 
24 - Disinfectant, Germicides, Mosquito repellents  26  42  -16 
34 - Exercise Books  0 14  -13 
40 - Fully built and CKD Bicycles Frames, Forks and Mudguards  15  24  -9 
3 - Birds Eggs  2 10  -8 
22 – Toothpaste  1 8  -7 
10 - Sugar Confectionaries [Other than Chocolate]  1  7  -6 
14 - Fruit Juice in Retail Packs  8  14  -6 
18 - Bentonites and Barytes  0  5  -5 
13 – Biscuits  0 5  -4 
29 - Corrugated Paper, Paper Boards, Cartons and Boxes  6  10  -4 
46 - Telephone Re-charge Cards  14  17  -3 
44 - Gaming Machines  0 2  -2 
15 - Waters, including Mineral Waters and Aerated Waters  0  2  -2 
30 - Calendars, Diaries, Enveloped, Greeting cards  3  4  -1 
5 - Cassava/Cassava Products  0  1  -1 
31 - Toilet Paper, Cleansing or Facial Tissues, Towel and similar Sanitary articles  3  4  -1 
37 - Cutlasses, Axes, Pick axes, Spades, Shovels and similar tools  2  3  -1 
11 - Cocoa Butter, Powder and Cakes  0  1  -1 
28 - Rethreaded and used Pneumatic tyres  3  3  -1 
4 - Flowers [Plastic and Fresh]  0  1  -1 
12 - Spaghetti/Noodles  2 2  0 
43 - Electric generating sound proof casings  28  29  0 
25 - Domestic Articles and Sanitary Wares of Plastics  8  8  0 
41 - Wheel Barrows  1 1  0 
16 - Waters, including Mineral Waters and Aerated Waters containing added Sugar  5  5  0 
19 - Bagged Cement  180 180  0 
21 - Waste Pharmaceuticals  0  0  0 
26 - Polypropylene Woven/Laminated Sacks and Bags  9  9  0 
36 - Hollow Glass Bottles of a capacity exceeding 150mls  5  5  0 
45 - Ball-Point Pens  2 2  0 
Source: Calculations by authors  
  
  